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Abstract
This article examines the role different aid allocation models play not only for con-
ventional development aid but also for two new financial flows, adaptation and mitigation
aid. We first test the three models proposed in the literature – recipient need, recipient
merit, and donor interests – using the latest available aid data and compare our results
with findings of older studies on Africa, and with studies on aid allocation on a global
scale. We find that the recipient merit model in more recent years no longer plays a role
for development aid allocation in Africa, in line with findings reported globally.
In contrast to such global studies, the logic of the donor interest model does not seem to
dominate over the recipient need model in the African context, as both are of equal
importance for aid allocation decisions. Finally, additionality seems to play a lesser role in
Africa than globally.
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Introduction
Africa today faces a twin development challenge – of developing economically while
also facing the consequences of climate change. In both areas, the region has limited
capacities, as acknowledged for instance in the climate negotiations (see e.g. UNFCCC,
2015: particularly Article 2). For this reason, global initiatives to help African countries
deal with this twin challenge are of high importance today. In particular, the reaction of
international donors, both bilateral and multilateral, towards Africa’s funding needs are
of high relevance for the continents’ capacity to attain sustainable development. Thus,
this article explores aid allocation patterns of various aid flows targeting primarily
development objectives on the one hand and climate objectives on the other.
To be more specific, we study the relationship between bilateral aid flows from
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donors to African
recipients. We investigate whether the allocation mechanisms driving development aid
flows are distinguishable from those targeting climate objectives, as promised by donors
under the term “additionality” (UNFCCC, 2009, 2010). For all aid flows, both targeting
development and climate objectives, we first investigate whether the three traditional aid
allocation mechanisms proposed in the literature – recipient need, recipient merit, and
donor interests (see e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Levin, 2006) – do play a
role in the African region. Furthermore, for the recipient merit model, we explore
whether in more recent years the recipient merit has declined in importance due to the
increased competition with new donors such as China, as proposed by Woods (2008) and
Kilama (2016). Finally, for the climate flows adaptation and mitigation aid, captured by
the Rio Markers and reported by the OECD (2011), we study whether the fourth allo-
cation mechanism – additionality – does play a role over and above the three traditional
mechanisms. For adaptation aid, we operationalise additionality as the climate-specific
need of countries to adapt to climate change, that is, how physically vulnerable they are
to climatic changes (ND-GAIN, 2013; Weiler et al., 2018), while for mitigation aid we
follow Bagchi et al. (2016) who state that mitigation efforts represent a public good,
hence this form of aid should target those countries with the highest greenhouse gas
emissions.
Given the available aid data provided by the OECD (2018) and other sources cap-
turing our independent variables, we are limited to study aid allocation from 1996 to
2016 for 28 OECD donors to 53 African recipient countries. Thus, for each year, we have
a fully dyadic data set capturing the various aid flows from each donor i to each recipient
j. We test our expectation using two-stage Cragg models (Clist, 2011; Cragg, 1971), that
is, for all aid flows, we run a selection stage model capturing whether a specific recipient
j does get aid from donor i in a given year. The allocation stage then models the amount
of aid provided for all country pairs for which aid has been recorded in a given year.
Thus, this study adds to the existing literature in various ways. First, it revisits the three
traditional aid allocation models for the African context using the newest available data.
Second, it contrasts climate and development aid in Africa to see whether different
allocation mechanisms apply. Finally, it contrasts these findings for the African context
with those reported at the global level. The results indicate that the three traditional aid
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allocation mechanisms do play a role for all aid flows, that is, climate flows tend to
follow similar patterns as conventional development aid flows, while the additionality
measures of these climate aid flows are only weak allocation determinants in the African
context.
The next section presents an overview of the existing literature and thereof derives
our expectations, then we present our data and the research design, followed by a dis-
cussion of the results of the statistical analysis. The last section concludes.
Literature Review and Expectations
There is a plethora of studies in the development literature, from older to more recent, on
general development aid allocation to developing countries (Ball and Johnson, 1996; Collier
and Dollar, 2002; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Stokke, 1989; White and McGillivray, 1995).
While various studies have different foci of aid, for instance, they might focus on the
consequences generated by aid flows (see Hagmann and Reyntjens, 2016, for an overview)
or the effectiveness of aid (for two recent studies, see Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015; Gehring
et al., 2017). In this study, however, we contribute to the question relating to the motives of
donors to provide aid, that is, why do they allocate their aid in a certain why, with a focus on
aid flows to African recipients. Specifically, our aim is to (1) check whether aid allocation
mechanism found in the literature do hold in the African context and (2) compare these
mechanisms for development aid flows and the newer climate aid flows.
Donor’s motives for aid allocation have received a fair amount of attention in the
literature, and it should be noted that studies investigating aid allocation patterns often
show that they vary widely among donors (e.g. White and McGillivray 1995). This
should be kept in mind in the following discussion. Work focusing on the rationale for
providing aid, starting in the 1970s, traditionally distinguishes between two sets of
motivations: the desire to help the poor on the one hand (Dudley and Montmarquette,
1976) and the simple and self-motivated desire to help oneself on the other (Dudley and
Montmarquette, 1976; McKinley, 1978; McKinley and Little, 1977, 1979). Former
prime minster of Britain, David Cameron, referred to these two motives slightly different
as the “heart” argument, the wish to do good, and the “head” argument, the motivation of
benefiting domestically from foreign aid flows (cited in Betzold and Weiler, 2018). In
the literature, these two arguments are more commonly referred today as the recipient
need and the donor interest models of aid allocation (McKinley and Little, 1977). More
recently, a third model of aid allocation was added, the recipient merit model. Adherents
of this model argue that aid allocation is positively associated with how well recipient
countries are governed, first because sound economic policies and stable democratic
institutions ensure that aid is used to benefit the people the flows are intended for, which
leads to aid effectiveness (United Nations, 2002: 6; 14) and second because donors, who
are for the most part highly democratic countries, intrinsically value the good govern-
ance and democratic institutions (Younas, 2008; Zanger, 2000).
We now briefly review the empirical evidence underpinning each aid allocation
model based on (general) studies, before discussing them in the African context. Donor
self-interest has typically been debated in terms of the economic potential for domestic
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exporters, colonial ties, or the political influence on aid recipients on the world stage
(Hagmann and Reyntjens, 2016). While Stokke (1989) finds that donor’s self-interests
are the key determinant of aid allocation, other studies are somewhat less negative and
provide evidence that a mix between donors’ self-interests and the more altruistic
recipient needs motives are at play when aid allocation decisions are made (Alesina and
Dollar, 2000; Berthe´lemy, 2006a, 2006b; Drury et al., 2005; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011).
Most, however, conclude that the former tend to be the stronger determinant of aid
allocation than the latter, but also that variations between donors are stark (Alesina and
Dollar, 2000; Clist, 2011; Younas, 2008). The evidence in favour of the recipient merit
model, that is, the claim that donors react to good governance in recipient countries by
providing more aid, is quite mixed, with some studies finding only limited evidence for
this relationship (Dollar and Levin, 2006; Figaj, 2010), while more recent studies on
climate aid do report stronger favourable results (Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Weiler et al.,
2018).
While the mentioned studies tend to have a global focus, that is, they investigate aid
provision to all developing countries, relating these findings to Africa is more difficult,
as work on aid allocation to African countries is relatively scarce, with most studies
either being relatively old by now or looking at aid disbursements of individual donors
only. The few studies we could identify on Africa often report similar results to the
general aid allocation literature. Schraeder et al. (1998), who studied thirty-six African
recipient countries, conclude that economic interests of donors are more important than
development needs of the recipients for aid allocation decisions. Riddell (1999) goes a
step further and claims that “donor aid levels are not critically linked to needs in Africa”,
thus implying that the recipient need model does not hold in the African context. In
contrast, Tuman and Ayoub (2004) find, for the specific case of Japanese aid to African
countries, that not only self-interest but also recipient needs play a significant role for the
country’s aid allocation decisions, which is an indication for the above-mentioned
variation between donors. In the light of these findings, we expect for the African
context that donor interests play a clear role (H1), with recipient needs also potentially
being a significant driver of aid allocation decisions as well, but maybe to a lesser degree
(H2). With regard to Africa, there is particular doubt about the validity of the recipient
merit model. In this context, van de Walle (2016) even speaks of “Africa democracy
fatigue,” a backlash against democracy and democracy promotion in Africa, which is
increasingly accepted by donors. Underlying this trend are various factors. First, the idea
that development is best achieved in countries not held back by the complications of
multi-party democracies, but in countries following the “Beijing Model” with single
parties and authoritarian rule, in which decisions can be made fast and be enforced
efficiently (van de Walle, 2016). This line of thought harks back to modernisation
theories which “provided an intellectual justification for authoritarian state-led devel-
opment interventions” (Hagmann and Reyntjens, 2016: 15). According to Olsen (2002),
this shift in priorities away from democracy promotion to more self-interested goals can
be seen in the policy shift of the EU policy towards Africa since the end of the cold war in
general. The second factor is the emergence of China as a new and big donor on the
African stage, without demanding good governance from recipients. This newcomer
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induces competing Western donors increasingly to also abstain from such demands as
well (Woods, 2008). Indeed, there is evidence that OECD donors do react and provide
more aid when China increases its activity in African countries (Kilama, 2016). Third, as
African countries started (on average) to grow stronger and to attract more foreign direct
investment, the reliance on Western aid diminished, as did the leverage of donors to
impose conditionality. Finally, the idea that good governance is rewarded through aid in
the short-run, and thus in the long-run is promoted as countries have an incentive to
improve their governance to attract higher aid-levels, is thwarted by findings that aid
may instead lead to a deterioration of governance in Africa (Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004;
Hagmann and Reyntjens, 2016; Knack, 2004). This undermines the rationale for
imposing conditionality in the first place. Therefore, we expect that good governance
only plays a secondary role (if at all) in the African context, particularly in more recent
years (H3).
We now turn to the discussion of climate aid, and how this relatively new form of aid
is allocated. Recent studies have shown that the three allocation models (recipient need,
recipient merit, donor interests) are also of relevance in the realm of climate aid (Figaj,
2010), and individually for both adaptation aid (Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Michaelowa
and Michaelowa, 2012; Robertsen et al., 2015; Robinson and Dornan, 2017; Weiler
et al., 2018) and mitigation aid (Bagchi et al., 2016; Halimanjaya, 2015). In particular
Weiler et al. (2018) mention that adaption aid flows follow “very closely” the pattern of
general aid flows to developing countries. This, however, calls into question whether the
new climate finance is indeed “new and additional,” as promised by donors during the
climate negotiations. Although the issue and definition of additionality is contested
between donors and recipients (Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Clemens and Moss, 2011;
Stadelmann et al., 2011), the question arises whether for the two new aid flows –
adaptation and mitigation aid – a fourth model of aid allocation capturing additionality
does play a role, in addition to the three conventional models discussed above.
For adaptation aid, this extra dimension is captured by recipient countries’ vulner-
ability to climate change impacts, that is, how strongly they are affected by a changing
climate (Weiler et al., 2018). While vulnerability is a contested concept (Adger, 2006), it
is most commonly subdivided into exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Muc-
cione et al., 2017; ND-GAIN, 2013). However, adaptive capacity can largely be seen as a
matter of resource availability and thus overlaps strongly with the recipient need model
of conventional development aid (Betzold and Weiler, 2018), and sensitivity is, to a large
degree, sector-specific (Weiler, 2019). Thus, for the purpose of this article, we define
additionality in the area of adaptation aid as that part of aid flows that are provided because
countries are physically exposed to climate impacts, that is, “the physical factors external
to the system that contribute to vulnerability” (ND-GAIN, n.d.) or the “degree to which a
system experiences environmental stress” (Adger, 2006: 270). It should be noted that
physical exposure can be seen as a substitute of recipient need (instead of poverty) when
focusing solely on the adaptation aid domain (e.g. as done by Betzold and Weiler, 2018).
However, we are interested in distinguishing between the traditional way to capture
recipient need, that is, poverty, from climate-specific recipient need, that is, exposure, to
climate impacts. If the latter is driving adaptation aid allocation in Africa, for the purpose
248 Africa Spectrum 54(3)
of this article, we equate this climate-specific recipient need with additionality, as it
captures an additional dimension of aid allocation different from the traditional recipient
need model to which we compare adaptation aid allocation. We, therefore, expect coun-
tries more exposed to climatic changes to receive more adaptation aid (H4a).
To define additionality for mitigation aid, we build on Bagchi’s et al. (2016) state-
ment that particularly for this form of aid “the traditional recipient need criteria [ . . . ]
would be completely misleading” (p. 10). Instead the authors argue that as mitigation
efforts represent a global public good, mitigation funds should be targeted at recipients
where they can make the biggest difference, that is, where emissions are highest and the
global benefits from resulting emission reductions are largest. Thus, we hypothesise that
countries with larger per capita CO2 emissions should receive higher amounts of miti-
gation aid (H4b).
Methods and Data
Dependent Variables
We use three dependent variables in the statistical analyses below to test our expecta-
tions: per capita development aid flows (minus climate aid flows),1 per capita adaptation
aid flows, and per capita mitigation aid flows. To generate these variables, we use data
from 1996 through 2016 for 28 OECD donors to 53 African recipients for development
aid flows, while for the climate aid flows only the years 2010 to 2016 are considered. All
data are taken from the OECD (2018) Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which provides
dyadic data for aggregate development aid flows on the one hand but also on project-
level data of official development assistance, including whether funding is relevant for
climate change adaptation and/or mitigation (according to donors’ own classification).
Thus, for the climate aid flows we use the Rio Markers system,2 by which OECD donors
since 2010 have identified projects where adaptation or mitigation were the principal
(i.e. main) or a significant (i.e. not the main, but still important) objective (see OECD,
2011). Using these Rio Markers, we are able to calculate overall climate aid flows from
donor i to recipient j in a given year.3 This value is then subtracted from the overall aid
flows for this donor–recipient dyad in the same year reported to the OECD. To calculate
adaptation and mitigation aid flows, all projects tagged with the appropriate Rio Marker
for all donor–recipient pairs are summed for the years 2010–2016. We apply this pro-
cedure to all projects where adaptation or mitigation were the principal (i.e. main) or a
significant (i.e. not the main, but still important) objective. Since projects can, for
instance, have adaptation as a main and mitigation as a significant objective, the two
climate aid flows are not mutually exclusive. To make the three thus calculated annual
aid flows comparable between recipients, in a final step, the per capita aid each recipient
receives is calculated by dividing the flows by the countries’ population.
It should be noted here that the reliability of the OECD DAC data is, to some degree,
in doubt (Adaptation Watch, 2015; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011). The reason
behind this is the self-reporting of donors and a lack of independent quality control,
which potentially leads to – sometimes significant – overestimation of aid flows
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(Weikmans et al., 2017). This is clearly problematic, yet a recent reassessment of the data
quality has revealed that the quality has improved and that misreporting is down to
approximately 10 per cent (Bagchi et al., 2016). While further improvements of the data
are desirable, they are the most comprehensive available data, and we consider the coding
error reported by Bagchi and colleagues to be acceptable for the purpose of this study.
Independent Variables
The predictor variables included in the all models are the following:
GDP per capita (recipient need): Per capita GDP for recipient countries is taken from
the World Development Indicators (WDIs) at 2010 constant US$ (World Bank, 2018). In
the models, the data are log-transformed. Since there is the potential endogeneity
problem of aid positively affecting GDP, we include this variable using a one-year lag in
the models below. GDP per capita provides a measure of poverty and a country’s
financial resources, so it is an important predictor for the allocation of both climate and
non-climate aid. How wealthy a country is can also be seen as an important indicator of
how well it will be able to cope with climatic changes. Hence, in the models using the
climate aid flows as dependent variables, this indicator is part of capturing the vulner-
ability of recipients to climate change.
LDC dummy (recipient need): The models include a dummy variable for countries
that are classified by the UN as least developed countries (LDCs). Our expectation is that
these countries receive higher levels of development aid, as well as adaptation-related
and mitigation-related climate finance, owing to (respectively) their significant devel-
opment challenges, vulnerability to climate change, and limited financial resources.
Governmental quality (recipient merit): A proxy for the quality of government in
recipient countries is taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGIs; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2018; Kaufmann et al., 2011). All six main indicators
(voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) were aggregated,
giving equal weight to each indicator. In the statistical models, the data are lagged by one
year. Higher WGI scores indicate that the recipient is better able use aid funds ade-
quately, which may lead to a positive relationship with both climate and non-climate aid.
At the same time, lower WGI scores indicating less government capacity may signal
greater need for aid funds. Since the WGIs only exist since 1996, this indicator limits the
time scale for the analysis of the general aid data.
Total exports (donor interest): We employ dyadic data on exports from the donor to
the recipient as a measure of the economic interests of donors, with the data taken from
the UN Comtrade database (United Nations Statistics Division, 2018). The data are log-
transformed. The greater the value of exports from donor countries to recipients, the
more likely it is in their interest to provide aid to the partner country (Younas, 2008). We,
therefore, expect a positive relationship between increased trade flows and “general”
development assistance. Strictly speaking, trade should not affect the allocation of aid
for adaptation and mitigation, given the stated purpose of these financial flows, though
our expectation is that the two are linked.
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UN voting (donor interest): Diplomatic relations and similarities in the preferences in
world politics between donors and recipients are captured in the UN General Assembly
Voting Data (Strezhnev and Voeten, 2013). We use the two-category dyadic affinity
scale ranging from 1 (least similar interests) to 1 (most similar interests). The data are
lagged by one year. The more similar the preferences of donors and recipients in the
international sphere, the more adaptation aid flows we expect to see.
Colonial ties (donor interest): Data on colonial ties between donors and recipients
were retrieved from the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell et al., 2015). Given that
donors often maintain close ties with former colonies, we expect former colonies to
receive more development assistance. Once again, we expect this to hold true for climate
finance, despite this being contrary to its stated purpose.
Population: Data on recipient countries’ population is taken from the WDI (World
Bank, 2018). In the statistical models, the data are again log-transformed. Population is
an important predictor of development assistance (for both climate and non-climate aid).
Larger countries are of greater geopolitical interest and more likely to receive aid, but at
the same time, population size influences the level of aid per capita, with smaller
countries receiving relatively more aid per capita.
In the models using climate aid as dependent variables, we also include a measure of the
mitigation potential of recipient countries as well as their vulnerability to climate change:
Vulnerability to climate change (additionality adaptation): While there are various
ways to capture vulnerability to climate change, the approach which has gained wide
recognition conceptualises vulnerability as having three dimensions: physical exposure,
sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Adger, 2006; Muccione et al., 2017; Smit and
Wandel, 2006). While the latter is already captured using GDP per capita, a system’s
sensitivity is very sector dependent (Weiler, 2019). Thus, we include a measure of
physical exposure to capture countries’ vulnerability to climate change impacts. Adger
(2006) describes exposure as the “degree to which a system experiences environmental
stress” (p. 269). Consequently, the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN,
n.d.) operationalises exposure as “the physical factors external to the system that con-
tribute to vulnerability,” and we use this measure in the models below.
Mitigation potential (additionality mitigation): To capture countries’ mitigation
potential, we use their CO2 emissions per capita as provided by the WDIs (World Bank,
2018). Greenhouse gas emissions, as a global public good, should ideally be reduced where
it is cheapest, thus donors have an opportunity to provide mitigation aid particularly to
countries with higher emissions to increase the impact of the funds. On the other hand,
countries with larger per capita emissions can be seen as carrying more responsibility for
climatic changes, which might lead to lower levels of adaptation funds flowing to such
countries, as this is considered compensation payment for damages caused by others.
Modelling Strategy
We apply a two-stage Cragg’s model (Clist, 2011; Manning et al., 1987) for the three
types of aid serving as dependent variables, following some recent studies on climate aid
(e.g. Halimanjaya, 2015; Weiler et al., 2018). Such models, also called double hurdle
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models (Cragg, 1971), distinguish between a selection and an allocation stage. In the
selection stage, donors decide whether to provide aid to a recipient country, and in the
allocation stage, they make decisions on the amount of aid they distribute to the selected
donors. The double-hurdle model is appropriate when the decisions to cross the two
hurdles are made separately, that is, are made at different points in time. Since decisions on
aid recipients are usually made for an extended period of time, while projects are selected
on a rolling basis, the double-hurdle model is appropriate when considering aid allocation
decisions. The two stages are econometrically modelled separately, but the allocation
stage must be interpreted conditionally on receiving aid at the selection stage (Clist, 2011).
In both stages, we include donor and year random effects, as a donor’s adaptation aid
allocations to many recipients in a given year cannot be regarded as entirely independent
decisions, and there are also reasons to believe that there is some form of coordination
between donors. The two stages of the Cragg’s model are implemented in R using the
lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015).
Results
In this section, we test the theoretical expectations for aid allocation in Africa using the
two-stage Cragg’s model and summarise the most important findings of this statistical
analysis. Table 1 lists the results of the selection stage, that is, the stage in which the
decision whether aid is provided or not is modelled. This stage therefore uses a binary
measure taking on the value of 1 when the form of aid in question was provided, and 0
otherwise. Table 2 exhibits the findings of the allocation stage, that is, the amount of aid
(in million constant US$) only for those recipients that where selected in the first stage is
modelled here. Both tables include four models. Model 1 captures overall development
aid (minus climate aid) since 1996, while model 2 only includes the years since 2010
(which allows direct comparison with the climate aid based on the Rio Markers, but also
an assessment of how development aid allocation has changed in recent years). Model 3
of both tables lists the results for adaptation aid and model 4 for mitigation aid.
We will progress as follows. First, we discuss donor interests (H1) needs and recipient
needs (H2), followed by a discussion of the validity of the recipient merit model (H3).
Then we will take a look at additionality in the case of adaptation and mitigation aid
(H4a and H4b) and check whether these allocation logics do play a role for these new
forms of aid, as promised by the donors.
Recipient Need and Donor Interests
In this section, we check whether our hypotheses are confirmed that the donor interests and
the recipient merit models do play a role in the African context, with the additional
expectation that the former is the stronger predictor of aid allocation decisions than the latter.
Of the donor interest variables, the economic ties measure – that is, bilateral trade – is
of particular importance both in the selection and in the allocation stage, according to the
models. However, this effect does not appear to domineer as strongly as expected. For
instance, in the selection stage of the development aid model since 2010 of Table 1, a
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change in exports from the lowest to the highest value is, all else equal, predicted to
increase the likelihood of receiving aid only by about 15 per cent. In contrast, for the
variable capturing recipient need – that is, GDP per capita – it can be seen in Figure 1
(top-right panel) that the poorest countries are highly likely to receive at least some
development aid from a given donor, with values above 85 per cent, while this prob-
ability drops significantly and below 50 per cent for the richest countries in the data set.
Looking at the full sample including all years, the GDP effect is even stronger (see top-
left panel of Figure 1), while the trade effect has about the same magnitude. In the
Table 1. Selection Stage Models.
Dependent Variable
Development
aid (all)
Development
aid (since 2010) Adaptation aid Mitigation aid
GDP per
capita (log)
0.470*** (0.028) 0.405*** (0.049) 0.557*** (0.062) 0.577*** (0.065)
LDCs dummy 0.430*** (0.059) 0.543*** (0.101) 0.059 (0.098) 0.044 (0.102)
WGI index 0.058*** (0.006) 0.015 (0.011) 0.171*** (0.011) 0.187*** (0.012)
Exports (log) 0.026*** (0.006) 0.031** (0.013) 0.130*** (0.021) 0.222*** (0.025)
UN voting 0.069 (0.123) 0.522** (0.204) 0.206 (0.197) 0.241 (0.195)
Colony
dummy
5.406*** (0.519) 5.698*** (1.034) 2.431*** (0.186) 2.012*** (0.182)
ND-GAIN
exposure
3.499*** (0.571) 3.434*** (0.591)
CO2 emissions 0.025 (0.026) 0.011 (0.026)
Population
(log)
0.617*** (0.018) 0.679*** (0.034) 0.625*** (0.036) 0.559*** (0.038)
Intercept 4.977*** (0.640) 6.510*** (0.860) 10.825*** (0.813) 11.189*** (0.824)
AIC 17,648.658 5,902.752 7,007.840 6,669.674
BIC 17,730.321 5,973.740 7,092.510 6,754.343
Log likelihood 8,814.329 2,941.376 3,491.920 3,322.837
Num.obs 26,014 8,944 8,568 8,568
Num.groups:
Donor
26 26 26 26
Num.groups:
Year
21 7 7 7
Var: Donor
(intercept)
6.423 6.470 2.403 1.787
Var: Year
(intercept)
0.077 0.008 0.011 0.000
Note: LDC ¼ least developed countries; WDI: Worldwide Governance Indicator; AIC: Akaike information
criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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allocation stage, this changes slightly. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 show that the
poorest countries in the data set can expect to receive about US$4–5 more per capita than
the richest, which is again evidence in favour of the recipient needs model. However, in
this allocation stage, the findings of the trade variable indicate that aid flows are pre-
dicted to increase from only about US$2 per capita at the lowest levels of trade to about
US$ 10 at the highest. This indicates that, in this second stage of aid disbursement, donor
self-interests play a (somewhat) stronger role than recipient needs.
Taken together, these findings are interesting as they indicate that Riddell’s (1999)
notion that aid is not linked to needs in Africa is, using the newest available data, no
Table 2. Allocation Stage Models.
Dependent variable
Development
aid (all)
Development
aid (since 2010) Adaptation aid Mitigation aid
GDP per capita
(log)
0.698*** (0.098) 1.112*** (0.163) 0.258*** (0.098) 0.089 (0.185)
LDCs dummy 1.094*** (0.190) 0.972*** (0.306) 0.069 (0.144) 0.250 (0.268)
WGI index 0.157*** (0.020) 0.130*** (0.034) 0.039** (0.017) 0.098*** (0.033)
Exports (log) 0.209 (0.354) 0.637 (0.575) 0.095 (0.225) 0.152 (0.408)
UN voting 11.480*** (0.338) 11.107*** (0.565) 0.147 (0.221) 1.023 (0.373)
Colony dummy 0.256*** (0.023) 0.056*** (0.057) 0.056** (0.026) (0.173)*** (0.054)
ND-GAIN
exposure
1.645* (0.871) 2.140 (1.645)
CO2 emissions 0.080** (0.038) 0.062 (0.067)
Population (log) 1.361*** (0.059) 1.550*** (0.105) 0.329*** (0.051) 0.554*** (0.095)
Intercept 25.891*** (1.400) 27.775*** (2.200) 2.643** (1.235) 5.887*** (2.265)
AIC 12,6870.010 45,249.113 10,834.969 11,857.010
BIC 12,6955.709 45,323.535 10,910.393 11,930.743
Log likelihood 63,424.005 22,613.556 5,404.485 5,915.505
Observations 17,868 6,410 2,445 2,147
Num.obs 26 26 25 25
Num.groups:
Donor
21 7 7 7
Num.group:
Year
4.922 6.881 0.168 0.407
Var: Donor
(intercept)
0.091 0.000 0.000 0.020
Var: Year
(intercept)
70.413 66.972 4.762 14.218
Note: LDC ¼ least developed countries; WDI: Worldwide Governance Indicator; AIC: Akaike information
criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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longer valid and that development aid allocation in Africa does follow – among others –
the recipient need model. Even by now relatively old conclusions reported by Schraeder
et al. (1998), which state that recipient needs do play a role but are trumped by donor
interests, must be reconsidered in the light of the new findings reported here. Recipient
needs seem to be (much) more important in the selection stage, and even in the allocation
stage, they are not much less influential than donor interests, particularly when con-
sidering that there are only very few dyads trading as much as required for the highest
predicted per capita aid levels. Thus, the good news of this first part or the findings is
that, while both H1 and H2 are confirmed, in the African context, it seems that Tuman
and Ayoub’s (2004) findings for Japan that both recipient needs and donor interests play
Figure 1. Selection Stage Effects for Per Capita GDP on All Tested Aid Flows (including 95%
confidence intervals): (a) Development Aid (All Data), (b) Development Aid (since 2010),
(c) Adaptation Aid, and (d) Mitigation Aid.
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a significant role can be generalised, with the former not being outperformed by the
latter. This is also in contrast with studies on the wider developing world (e.g. see
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011), which tends to show that donor
interests are the stronger drivers for aid allocation decisions than recipient needs, and
might indicate that donors do consider needs in Africa more than elsewhere. While here
we can only speculate on why this might be the case,4 further research in this direction is
desirable. For adaptation and mitigation aid, the picture is somewhat mixed (see panels
(c) and (d) of Figures 1 and 2). While in the selection stage both forms of aid are
negatively linked to GDP per capita, indicating that richer countries are less likely to
receive aid, in the allocation stage the coefficient for mitigation is not significant, and for
adaptation it is even significant and positive. Particularly the latter finding is interesting,
as this is contrary to recent studies on adaptation aid allocation among all developing
Figure 2. Allocation Stage Effects for Per Capita GDP on All Tested Aid Flows (including 95%
confidence intervals): (a) Development Aid (All Data), (b) Development Aid (since 2010),
(c) Adaptation Aid, and (d) Mitigation Aid.
256 Africa Spectrum 54(3)
countries, which found that the recipient need model also holds in the allocation stage
(Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Weiler et al., 2018). As GDP per capita can also be con-
sidered to be part of countries vulnerability to climate change (Brooks et al., 2005), as
higher wealth increases adaptive capacity, this is an interesting finding that sets Africa
apart and would merit further academic attention. For mitigation aid, the positive effect
in the selection stage somewhat contradicts the idea of Bagchi et al. (2016) that tradi-
tional recipient need criteria should play no role for mitigation aid, as it should go to
countries with the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, these findings
show that in Africa, as elsewhere, allocation of new forms of aid is still linked to tra-
ditional development aid. What about donor interest in the adaptation and mitigation
case? In both cases, the selection stages predict a strong increase in the likelihood of
receiving aid from almost zero to about 29 per cent in the allocation case, and even more
strongly to about 39 per cent in the mitigation case. The amount of aid increases by about
US$1.5 over the range of the export variable for adaptation aid, and by about US$4 in the
mitigation case. Taken together, these findings indicate that climate aid in Africa is still
strongly linked to how “traditional” development aid is disbursed.
Recipient Merit
Recipient merit is, for the purpose of this study, captured using the WGI index, that is, a
composition of all six indicators included in the WGIs. The findings are highly inter-
esting, as the models in the selection stage predict that, over the range of the WGI
variable, the effect of recipient merit has about the same magnitude as the economic self-
interest variable measure by exports (and in the adaptation aid case the effect is even
slightly stronger). The one exception can be seen in model 2 of Table 1, which captures
only the years since 2010 for development aid. In this model, the effect is insignificant,
meaning that in more recent years, recipient merit did not play a role for which countries
were targeted with this form of aid. This is empirical evidence in favour of the idea of
democracy fatigue in Africa, as argued by van de Walle (2016). However, in the same
time frame, the two climate aid flows do seem (strongly) linked to recipient merit. It
could be argued that this might be the case because Western donors are in competition
with new donors, primarily China, in the realm of development aid (Kilama, 2016;
Woods, 2008), while in the area of climate aid this competition is not (yet) present and
conditionality therefore still applies. While this remains speculation at this point, and
more research in this direction is in order, the findings here are also in line with recent
studies on a global scale: while the general aid literature does find only a weak link
between donor merit and aid provision (Dollar and Levin, 2006; Figaj, 2010), the
relationship in the climate aid case does seem to hold (Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Weiler
et al., 2018). Africa does not seem to be an exception in this respect, and therefore, there
is considerable doubt about the validity of H3 in the realm of general development aid, as
also the findings of the allocation stage models, albeit significant, are very small in
magnitude (increasing the predicted amount of aid only by US$2–3 over the range of the
WGI index). In contrast, H3 seems to be corroborated for the climate aid case.
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Additionality and Climate Aid
Regarding climate aid we test – in addition to the three traditional aid allocation models –
the two ideas that adaptation aid should be related to vulnerability to climatic changes
(using the ND-GAIN exposure index), and mitigation aid should be based on greenhouse
gas emissions to increase the provision of a global public good. While there is some
evidence for the former argument (see Figure 3, panels (a) and (c)), the idea that donors
promote the reduction of emissions when given mitigation aid cannot be corroborated
using the CO2 emissions measure provided by the World Bank (2018). Even in the
adaptation aid case, the effects of recipients’ exposure to climatic changes is relatively
weak (in both stages), compared to some other findings reported in this study. Inter-
estingly, even mitigation aid is positively related to exposure in the selection stage (panel
(b) of Figure 3), but not so in the allocation stage (panel (d)). And the negative effect of
greenhouse gas emissions in the allocation stage of the adaptation aid model might
indicate that donors do consider the responsibility of recipients when allocating this form
of aid and help predominantly those who are least responsible for the caused damage.
All these findings together indicate that additionality in the mitigation aid case does
not play much of a role in the African context. Thus, we come to a similar conclusion as
Bagchi et al. (2016), who state for a global sample of countries “that donors do not very
clearly differentiate their mitigation related aid allocation criteria from the criteria for
general ODA” (p. 18). We see this as well, both for mitigation and for adaptation aid, that
the variables used to capture the traditional aid allocation models are the much better
predictors of climate aid flows than our additionality measures. Other than Bagchi et al.
(2016), we find no evidence that mitigation funds are allocated according to mitigation-
related efficiency criteria, but we admittedly measure this more crudely for the African
context, and more research in that direction using more fine-grained measures is
desirable. For adaptation aid, on the other hand, the findings indicate that exposure to
climatic changes in Africa is linked to the disbursement of these funds, but less so than
on a global scale (see Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Weiler et al., 2018). Thus, we conclude
that while there is some evidence supporting H4a, we must reject H4b.
It follows that in Africa, even more so than on the wider scale across all developing
countries, climate aid follows to a large degree the allocation logic of development aid,
and particularly the traditional recipient needs model (i.e. poverty) and economic self-
interests of donors drive climate aid allocation decisions. The one interesting exception
here is the recipient merit model, which does hold in the climate aid case, while no longer
prevailing for development aid. Nevertheless, African countries should, in the context of
the ongoing climate negotiations, insist that donors keep their promise and disburse
climate funds according to a climate-related logic (Ayers and Huq, 2009; UNFCCC,
2015; UNFCCC, 2009), and not just give some of the flows a green label.
Conclusions
Existing empirical studies on the determinants of general development aid to developing
countries often revolve around three aid allocation mechanisms, namely recipient needs,
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recipient merit, and donor interests (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar,
2002; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Stokke, 1989). In this study, we investigate these
mechanisms specifically for the African development aid context since 1996, yet we
extend the discussion by adding the dimension of additionality for the two relatively new
climate aid flows, that is, mitigation and adaptation aid (Bagchi et al., 2016; Weiler et al.,
2018). Thus, this study explores whether traditional aid allocation mechanisms discussed
in the literature do hold in the African context, and whether they still do in more recent
times, but also whether the same allocation logic can be applied to the climate aid flows,
or whether these new financial flows indeed follow a different allocation logic, as
demanded by recipients and promised by donors (Ayers and Huq, 2009; UNFCCC, 2015;
UNFCCC, 2009). For climate aid, we propose two different hypotheses, namely that
Figure 3. Effects of Vulnerability Indicator ND-GAIN Exposure on Selection and Allocation
Stages for Adaptation and Mitigation Aid (including 95% confidence intervals): (a) Adaptation Aid,
(b) Mitigation Aid, (c) Adaptation Aid, and (d) Mitigation Aid.
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adaptation aid should follow a need-based allocation logic with countries more vul-
nerable to climate change impacts expected to receive more from this funding source
(Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Weiler et al., 2018), while the larger polluters in terms of
greenhouse gas emission should receive more mitigation aid, as they can make the
largest contributions to providing the global public good this funding stream is designed
for, that is, greenhouse gas mitigation (Bagchi et al., 2016).
Our findings show that the recipient needs model for general development aid allo-
cation is valid in the African context, which contradicts and updates older studies which
concluded that aid in Africa is not linked to development needs (Riddell, 1999). At the
same time, we also show that donor interests – particularly economic interests – are also
strong predictors of who receives aid, and how much. This places development aid in
Africa more in line with general findings reported in the aid literature (see e.g.
Berthe´lemy, 2006b; Berthe´lemy, 2006a; Clist, 2011; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011).
However, we somewhat surprisingly find that, in contrast to studies covering all
developing countries, recipient needs are not secondary to donor interests in the African
context, which we consider an interesting finding and good news. These findings for
general development aid also hold for the climate aid flows. They show that climate aid
to Africa largely follows development aid, which is again in line with findings reported
on a global scale. When investigating the factor additionality for adaptation and miti-
gation aid, on the other hand, the present study shows that they tend to be weaker
determinants for climate aid in the African context than globally (Bagchi et al., 2016;
Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Weiler et al., 2018). Finally, on the recipient merit criterion,
our study finds that this allocation mechanism does not hold for development aid in later
years (while still valid in the climate aid models) and thus is evidence for the
“democratic fatigue” hypothesis in Africa proposed by van de Walle (2016).
This study is novel in its approach of contrasting climate and development aid,
especially in the African context, but also because it revisits the three traditional aid
allocation models for Africa using the newest available data. However, as always, this
study has limitations, which also represent opportunities for future research. First, the
findings that recipient merit no longer holds true for development aid in more recent
years due to donor competition and “democratic fatigue,” while in the climate aid case, it
is still valid and needs more investigation. We speculate that the reason behind this is that
donor competition does not (yet) play in role in the realm of climate aid, but this needs
close investigation using actual data on donor competition (including data from new
donors). Second, for the purpose of this study, we use relatively broad measures to
capture additionality. In the case of adaptation aid, we consider only physical exposure,
while adaptive capacity is included in the general measure of GDP per capita used to
operationalise recipient needs. Future research could develop finer measures to capture
vulnerability, and particularly also a measure for (sector-specific) climate sensitivity (see
Weiler, 2019). Also in the case of measuring additionality for mitigation aid, future
research should follow Bagchi et al. (2016) and use more fine-grained measures. Finally,
we only consider bilateral aid from OECD donors to African recipient countries. While
this makes up the bulk of the aid flows, a comparison with multilateral aid flows and
flows from non-OECD donors would be a useful venture for future research.
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Notes
1. This subtraction of climate aid from total aid to obtain development aid is done with the purpose
of separating the two flows, which should follow different allocation logics according to the
promise given by donors that climate aid should be “new and additional” (which leads to our
theoretical considerations). There is some double counting of development aid and climate aid,
hence this procedure might under-estimate development aid slightly (Betzold and Weiler,
2018).
2. In 2009, at the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen, developed countries pledged to provide
climate finance of US$30 billion a year, and to increase this sum gradually to US$100 billion a
year by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2009). While these financial flows stem from a host of public and
private sources and bilateral and multilateral channels, in reality they are drawn to a large
degree from public aid budgets (Khan and Roberts, 2013), and are still predominantly distrib-
uted bilaterally (Betzold and Weiler, 2018). Thus, the Rio Markers are appropriate to compare
the allocation of these funds to conventional development aid.
3. Projects with significant climate objectives would have taken place in any case for a different
purpose (OECD, 2011). We therefore also code a second variable for adaptation and mitigation
aid using principal aid flows only and run the analysis presented below again as a robustness
test. We show the results for the principal aid variables, which are very similar to those
presented in the main text, in Appendix Table A1. In addition, due to the volatility of aid flows
(Bulı´rˇ and Hamann, 2008), we also follow the previous literature and aggregate our various aid
variables into 5-year periods. The results are shown in Appendix Tables A2 and A3 and are
again very similar to the annual models presented in the main text.
4. A reason might be the combination of donors recognising the urgent development needs of
African countries one the one hand, combined with the marginal importance these countries
play for donors’ exporting industries.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Robustness Check for Climate Aid Models Using Principal Aid Only.
Dependent variable
Adaptation aid
(Select. Stage)
Adaptation aid
(Alloc. Stage)
Mitigation aid
(Select. Stage)
Mitigation aid
(Alloc. Stage)
GDP per
capita (log)
0.549*** (0.085) 0.738*** (0.220) 0.644*** (0.089) 0.209 (0.385)
LDCs dummy 0.199 (0.132) 0.103 (0.305) 0.011 (0.136) 0.542 (0.536)
WGI index 0.210*** (0.016) 0.025 (0.039) 0.209*** (0.016) 0.136** (0.064)
Exports (log) 0.248*** (0.033) 0.097 (0.068) 0.324*** (0.035) 0.328** (0.130)
UN voting 0.319 (0.254) 0.008 (0.398) 0.055 (0.264) 0.31 (0.705)
Colony
dummy
1.983*** (0.192) 0.21 (0.367) 1.790*** (0.189) 2.399*** (0.630)
ND-GAIN
exposure
4.569*** (0.767) 4.555** (1.842) 2.317*** (0.764) 4.388 (3.256)
CO2 emissions 0.031 (0.033) 0.094* (0.057) 0.001 (0.031) 0.139 (0.120)
Population
(log)
0.501*** (0.050) 0.638*** (0.119) 0.453*** (0.050) 0.793*** (0.194)
Intercept 12.616*** (1.060) 2.088 (2.744) 11.588*** (1.104) 5.788 (4.634)
AIC 4,540.112 5,205.249 4,442.881 6,136.28
BIC 4,624.781 5,269.535 4,527.551 6,200.3
Log likelihood 2,258.056 2,589.625 2,209.441 3,055.14
Observations 8,568 1,038 8,568 1,017
Number:
Donors
26 24 26 21
Number:
Years
7 7 7 7
Variance:
Donor
1.346 0.29 1.786 0.943
Variance: Year 0.038 0.001 0.008 0.07
Var: Residual 8.388 23.372
Note: LDC ¼ least developed countries; WDI: Worldwide Governance Indicator; AIC: Akaike information
criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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Table A2. Robustness Check Allocation Stage Models, Using Five Year-Averaged Dependent
Variables.
Dependent variable
Development aid Adaptation aid Mitigation aid
GDP per capita (log) 0.502*** (0.076) 0.551*** (0.110) 0.538*** (0.112)
LDCs dummy 0.315** (0.158) 0.127 (0.175) 0.126 (0.177)
WGI index 0.051*** (0.017) 0.146*** (0.020) 0.180*** (0.020)
Exports (log) 0.048*** (0.018) 0.127*** (0.037) 0.233*** (0.042)
UN voting 0.164 (0.611) 0.808 (0.492) 1.219* (0.494)
Colony dummy 3.124*** (0.388) 2.593*** (0.377)
ND-GAIN exposure 4.110*** (1.029) 4.397*** (1.034)
CO2 emissions 0.05 (0.047) 0.027 (0.049)
Population (log) 0.568*** (0.054) 0.604*** (0.065) 0.515*** (0.067)
Intercept 3.034** (1.332) 9.772*** (1.405) 10.188*** (1.404)
AIC 2,444.197 2,163.956 2,141.931
BIC 2,502.731 2,233.354 2,211.33
Log likelihood 1,213.099 1,069.978 1,058.965
Observations 4,933 2,400 2,400
Number: Donors 26 26 26
Number: Years 4 2 2
Variance: Donor 8.172 2.686 2.248
Variance: Year 0.33 0.044 0.032
Note: LDC ¼ least developed countries; WDI: Worldwide Governance Indicator; AIC: Akaike information
criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Table A3. Robustness Check Selection Stage Models, Using Five Year-Averaged Dependent
Variables.
Dependent variable
Adaptation aid
(Select. Stage)
Adaptation aid
(Alloc. Stage)
Mitigation aid
(Select. Stage)
GDP per capita (log) 0.672*** (0.153) 0.121* (0.069) 0.052 (0.127)
LDCs dummy 0.916*** (0.296) 0.076 (0.105) 0.185 (0.194)
WGI index 0.133*** (0.032) 0.037*** (0.012) 0.063*** (0.023)
Exports (log) 0.285*** (0.039) 0.056*** (0.020) 0.152*** (0.041)
UN voting 1.056 (0.757) 0.168 (0.196) 0.029 (0.331)
Colony dummy 11.131*** (0.551) 0.258 (0.165) 0.461 (0.289)
(continued)
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Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Klimahilfe fu¨r Afrika:
Ein Vergleich von Allokationsmodellen fu¨r verschiedene
Hilfsstro¨me
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Rolle verschiedener Allokationsmodelle bei der Vergabe von finan-
ziellen Mitteln fu¨r die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie im Bereich der Klimahilfe (Mitigation
und Adaptation). In einem ersten Schritt werden die drei in der Literatur vorgeschlagenen Modelle
- Bedu¨rftigkeit, Verdienst und Eigeninteresse - mithilfe der neuesten verfu¨gbaren Daten getestet.
Diese Ergebnisse werden dann mit den Resultaten a¨lterer Studien mit einem Fokus auf Afrika
verglichen, aber auch mit Allokationsstudien mit einer globalen Perspektive. Fu¨r die letzten in der
Studie inkludierten Jahre spielt das Modell des Verdiensts der Empfa¨nger fu¨r Afrika keine Rolle
mehr, was die neuesten Erkenntnisse anderer Studien mit globaler Dimension widerspiegelt.
Abweichend von den Ergebnissen solcher globalen Studien zeigt sich fu¨r Afrika jedoch, dass die
Eigeninteressen der Geberla¨nder bei der Vergabe der Gelder nicht im Vordergrund stehen, sondern
die Bedu¨rftigkeit der Nehmerla¨nder dominiert. Spezifisch fu¨r die Klimahilfe zeigt sich schließlich
noch, dass Additionalita¨t in Afrika eine geringere Rolle spielt als auf globaler Ebene.
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Table A3. (continued)
Dependent variable
Adaptation aid
(Select. Stage)
Adaptation aid
(Alloc. Stage)
Mitigation aid
(Select. Stage)
ND-GAIN exposure 1.197* (0.634) 1.386 (1.175)
CO2 emissions 0.051* (0.027) 0.029 (0.049)
Population (log) 1.140*** (0.097) 0.191*** (0.037) 0.337*** (0.070)
Intercept 21.639*** (2.165) 1.511* (0.859) 3.441** (1.541)
AIC 24,513.768 3,097.18 3,965.971
BIC 24,582.441 3,161.327 4,029.186
Log likelihood 12,245.884 1,535.59 1,969.985
Observations 3,801 1,027 956
Number: Donors 26 25 24
Number: Years 4 2 2
Variance: Donor 3.19 0.069 0.164
Variance: Year 0.062 0.007 0.001
Var: Residual 36.084 1.101 3.465
Note: LDC ¼ least developed countries; WDI: Worldwide Governance Indicator; AIC: Akaike information
criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
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